The new intelligence service will strengthen Sweden's security - but the bill also allows for extensive collection of sensitive data. With the wording “absolutely necessary” as a limit, information about opinions and personal relationships may also be processed. At the same time, both Swedish and foreign actors are given access to data in a system where transparency is limited.
On Tuesday morning, the government called for press conference where Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard presented the proposal for a new civilian intelligence service, the Swedish Foreign Intelligence Service (FSIS). According to the plan, the agency will start operating on January 1, 2027 and will complement the military intelligence service.
During the press conference, Stenergard described the situation as serious and stressed that Sweden urgently needs to strengthen its ability to collect and analyze information.
- The serious security situation makes it urgent to rapidly increase the overall capability of the Swedish intelligence system, she said.
She also highlighted that modern intelligence operations rely heavily on technical systems and access to large amounts of data. The government therefore believes that a new structure is needed to meet today's requirements and to cooperate effectively with other countries.
After the press conference, the legislative referral which is now being sent out.
Many had likened the planned new intelligence service to the US CIA, as proposed by the globalist former prime minister Carl Bildt. Now Stenergard says to Aftonbladet she sees it more as a ”Swedish MI6”, that is, the British intelligence service.
Own regulatory framework - outside the GDPR
A key element of the proposal is to exempt the service from the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Instead, a special law will be introduced that gives the intelligence service its own rules for how personal data can be processed.
The definition of processing is very broad and covers everything from collection to analysis and dissemination. This means that almost all processing of information falls within the scope of what the Agency is allowed to do.
At the same time, there is no requirement for impact assessments and penalties, which are otherwise key elements of data protection regulations. All in all, this means that the same level of protection that applies to other authorities and companies does not apply here, despite the fact that the activities involve highly sensitive information.
Sensitive data can be used
The draft law states that sensitive personal data, such as political opinions, religion and health, should basically not be processed. At the same time, it opens up an exception: the data may be used if it is considered “strictly necessary” for the activity.
This means that precisely the most sensitive data (people's political opinions, religious beliefs and personal circumstances) can, in some cases, be collected and analyzed for intelligence purposes. In addition, allowing the agency to process biometric data, which is used to identify individuals, creates technical possibilities to link this type of information to specific individuals and follow them over time.
At the same time, the term “absolutely necessary” is not further defined in the legal text. It is stated as a condition, but without clear limits on what is covered in practice. The assessment of what meets the requirement is thus tied to the needs and purposes of the activity, leaving a wide margin of interpretation.
Combined with the fact that the activities relate to threat assessments and international security issues (areas where definitions can be broad and changing), this means that the collection and processing of sensitive data can take place within a relatively open framework. This includes political and other personal data, as the law explicitly allows such processing when the requirement is deemed to be met. Overall, this means that the limit of what is actually recorded is not clear from the text of the law.
Direct access - also for foreign services
The proposal means that several Swedish authorities will have direct access to the new intelligence service's data. Säpo, the Swedish Armed Forces and FRA can access both analysis results and data through direct access.
At the same time, it opens up the possibility for foreign intelligence and security services to gain similar access. This is particularly true in the context of international cooperation, where information can be made available directly in the systems.
This means that control over the information is in practice shared with other actors. Once data is made available in this way, the ability to control its further use is reduced, especially in international contexts where different regulatory frameworks apply.
Limited transparency for individuals
Under the proposal, the individual has the right to request information about the data being processed. However, this right is limited by confidentiality provisions that give the authority wide discretion to refuse access.
The authority does not have to disclose data or give reasons for keeping information secret. This means that a person may be registered without being told, and without being able to check the accuracy of the data.
In practice, this means that the possibility of access and rectification is limited, especially in cases where the information is classified as security sensitive.
Weak protection in case of failure
Although the agency is given wide powers, there is no system of fines for breaking rules. This means that if data is mishandled, there are no direct penalties for the agency. The person affected must discover the error themselves and claim compensation afterwards.
At the same time, the possibility of detecting such errors is limited, as much information is subject to confidentiality. In practice, this places the responsibility on the individual, even though there is little transparency.
Signals intelligence and hidden identities
The consultation also reveals changes to the regulatory framework for signals intelligence. The new authority will be able to influence the focus of signals intelligence, which will determine which communications are collected.
At the same time, the agency is authorized to use qualified protective identities, which means that staff can operate under other identities in intelligence work. This shows that the activities are not only about analysis, but also about operational methods that are inherently difficult to scrutinize from the outside.
Increased powers - limited control
The draft legislation shows that the new intelligence service will radically change the way information can be collected, processed and shared.
Overall, the proposal points to a system where the authority is given broad discretion, while transparency is reduced and control mechanisms are limited. This means that issues of how information is used, what data is collected and how the boundaries are drawn in practice will be crucial - but not fully defined in the legal text.
The oppression and control of our people is increasing rapidly now that the rulers are fully committed to implementing the globalists' agenda.It is a bit laughable when you then hear how our politicians make fun and complain about how difficult people have it in Russia and China with the control of people.